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Criticizing the Obligatory Acts of
Lawyers: A Response to Markovits's Legal
Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View
Alec Walen*
INTRODUCTION
It is tempting to think that if the role of being a lawyer is justified, then
a lawyer who occupies that role in a way consistent with its justification
cannot be ethically criticized for what he does. But Daniel Markovits
rightly points out that we cannot rest our ethical inquiry so easily. Even if
we suppose that something like our current adversary system, as an
institution, is morally justified, something is still ethically askew.
Lawyers engage in, among other ethically dubious practices, "sharp
practices - papering cases, filing implausible claims and counterclaims,
and delaying or extending discovery - in order to force advantageous
settlements."' And it is not simply descriptively true that lawyers act this
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Baltimore. Thanks to Dan Markovits for inviting
me to make this response and for correspondence regarding its contents.
1. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209,
218 (2004) [hereinafter Markovits].
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way; their jobs sometimes require them to act this way. Putting the point
more generally and more provocatively, Markovits claims that "the duties
attached to their professional roles require lawyers to lie, to cheat, and to
abuse."2 Even if the adversary system as a whole is justified, and even if
such practices are an essential part of an adversary legal system, we
should expect lawyers to be subject to criticism for such behavior. For
how can lying, cheating, and abusing be ethically beyond reproach?
But this raises a puzzle. How can we make sense of the thought that
certain actions are ethically obligatory, and at the same time that one can
be ethically criticized for taking them? Doesn't criticism imply that one
should be acting differently? And if one should be acting differently, how
can one also be obliged to act that way?
Markovits offers an answer. He suggests that there are two potentially
conflicting frameworks of moral justification: a third-person framework in
which morality is concerned fundamentally with treating people
impartially as equally worthy of respect; and a first-person framework in
which morality is concerned fundamentally with personal integrity, or the
coherence of one's actions with one's values and character.3 An action
justified in one framework may not be justified in the other.4 On this
suggestion, if a lawyer has a duty to lie, cheat, or abuse, it is due to her
role in the impartially justified adversary system. But such a duty will
likely conflict with her first-person, integrity-based reasons. The moral
criticism directed at lawyers, and a good lawyer's ethical discomfort with
her job, reflects this failing of integrity.
Although Markovits's answer is superficially plausible, and is presented
with a high degree of sophistication, I think Markovits both exaggerates
and misdiagnoses the problem. He exaggerates the problem insofar as he
argues that in an ideal adversary system, lawyers are ethically obliged to
lie, cheat, and abuse. He misdiagnoses the problem insofar as he argues
that the tension arises out of a tension between first-person and third-
person frameworks for moral justification.
Regarding Markovits' exaggeration of the problem, I believe we should
distinguish two models of the adversary system. In an ideal adversary
system, lawyers aid their clients by making legal and factual arguments
that appeal to reason. They avoid using intentionally misleading rhetoric
and manipulative appeals to emotion. They also take on clients only when
they are not seeking to pursue immoral ends or to exploit unfair
2. Id. at 219.
3. Markovits does not frame the problem as I have. He distinguishes two grounds for criticizing
lawyers: their partiality and what he calls their lawyerly vices. His concern is to argue that even if
lawyerly partiality can be justified impartially, lawyerly vices cannot. See id- at 220. At bottom,
however, I think we are concerned with the same problem.
4. As Markovits puts it, he is investigating "the independent, and possibly divergent, demands of
third-personal and first-personal ethical justification." Id. at 222.
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advantages in a morally objectionable way, or when there is some other
moral end that can be served only by serving those clients - ends such as
protecting fundamental rights or keeping the power of the state in check.
On this model, lawyers take sides and aim to serve the interests of their
clients when those interests can morally be served. But they aim to serve
the interests of their clients only insofar as those interests would be served
by a defensible understanding of the law applied to an honest
representation of the facts. In such a system, lawyers are not truly zealous
advocates, for though they work on behalf of their clients, they temper
what they will do for their clients so as not to undermine the moral rights
of others or the functions of the judge and jury. In such a system, there is
never an obligation to lie, cheat, or abuse.'
On the other model of the adversary system, lawyers do whatever they
can within the law to help their clients win. I call this the zealous
adversary system. The zealous adversary system is more or less the model
of our actual adversary system. It does, at least sometimes, call for
lawyers to lie, cheat, and abuse. However, even with such a system in
place, lawyers still have an ethical duty to refuse to help unscrupulous
clients unless there is some other overriding good at stake. And even
when their clients are pursuing morally permissible or even morally
laudable ends, the permissibility and propriety of using ethically troubling
means is limited. A lawyer may use these means only insofar as using
them is made necessary by others using them too - necessary in the sense
that without using such means, it would not be possible to serve good
people or to prevent them from being put at an unfair disadvantage. Thus,
the need to lie, cheat, and abuse, and to face the criticism that seems to
attach to such practices, arises only in limited circumstances and only in
the zealous adversary system.
Markovits misdiagnoses the tension between the justification for the
adversary system and the criticism of legal practices that it demands by
arguing that it arises from a gap between what he calls "third-personal
impartial moral justification" and "first-person ethical" justification.
6
Markovits goes wrong, I argue, in thinking that morality is usefully carved
up into these two distinct domains of justification. Morality is always
concerned both with impartiality and partiality. It takes into account the
way we each must see ourselves as just one person among many and as an
individual who has his or her own life to lead.' It is a deep mistake about
5. The view I embrace as ideal is essentially the view articulated in DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE (1988), especially chapter 8. 1 do not share all of Luban's concerns with corporations as
especially problematic, see id. at 156-57, nor his distinction between weighty and pragmatic
justifications. See id. at 148-49. But his conception of the lawyer as having no special moral
permission to promote immoral cause is, I think, deeply right. See id. at 155.
6. Markovits, supra note 1, at 222, 221.
7. As Thomas Nagel puts the point, when we reason consistently with morality, "We are
20041
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morality to assume that it can be broken into two distinct domains of
justification. Furthermore, it is a deep mistake in philosophy to assume
that there is a first-person point of view that is fundamentally separate
from the points of view of others.
With regard to the misdiagnosis, it may be tempting to say that
Markovits cannot be that far off base. One might want to argue that all he
is saying, really, is that there is a difference between ethical theories that
focus on one's relation to others and ethical theories that focus on what it
means to lead a good life. Teleological theories like utilitarianism and
deontological theories like Kantianism are both examples of outward
looking theories that deal with oneself in relation to others, while virtue
ethics focuses inwardly on what it means to lead a good life. Markovits is
merely stressing, one might think, the importance of virtue ethics.8
But difference in focus should not be confused with difference in
subject matter. Utilitarianism makes room for partial concern with one's
own life in an instrumental or derivative way; Kantianism makes room for
it as a fundamental feature of morality. Looking at morality from another
perspective, virtue ethics holds that among the necessary conditions for
living well is that one respect the value and claims of others. In this way,
though they have different starting points, both the outwardly focused and
the inwardly focused theories try to take into account, and make sense of,
the proper place of both partiality and impartiality. It would be a mistake
to treat these differently focused theories as presenting different and
conflicting frameworks of justification.
I think a better diagnosis of the puzzle regarding how there can be
obligatory actions that nonetheless merit criticism is that the obligations
reflect what must be done in the actual world, and the criticisms reflect the
way the real world deviates from the ideal. The real world deviates from
the ideal world due to a kind of race to the bottom. This race towards
zealous advocacy is driven by various pressures, including the desire to
keep unscrupulous clients with unscrupulous lawyers in check, the
economic pressure to win, and the temptations of a false ethical ideology
according to which lawyers should do whatever they can do and get away
with doing that will help their clients win. The criticism that still attaches
to sharp practices, even when they are justified as necessary means of
preventing morally deserving clients from being put at an unfair
disadvantage, reflects a disgust with the race to the bottom in general. But
it also reflects a discomfort with letting the ends justify the means.
simultaneously partial to ourselves, impartial amongst everyone, and respectful of everyone's
partiality." THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 38 (1991). Nagel is pessimistic that the
demands of partiality and impartiality can both be met. But he does not think we can abandon or
diminish the importance of either standpoint. Rather, his pessimism leads him to ask "Under what
circumstances is it possible to live as we should." Id. at 52.
8. Markovits himselfseems to view his point this way. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 224-25.
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I proceed as follows. First, I review Markovits's two-pronged approach
to the ethical problems of lawyers - one dealing with partiality, the other
dealing with lawyerly vices. I suggest that he mislabels the problem
which he calls the problem of partiality. What Markovits sees as the
problem of partiality is really a two-pronged problem: 1) following the
dictates of the law when the law requires an unjust result, a problem as
much for impartial judges as for partial lawyers; and, 2) choosing to serve
undeserving clients. The second prong can lead to problematic partiality
when lawyers are overly zealous in the pursuit of victory for their clients.
But the underlying problem is a failure to use discretion properly. As for
the lawyerly vices, I suggest that these are not best viewed as "vices" or
character defects. Rather, they are better viewed simply as ethically
problematic actions. And the problem of lawyers performing such actions
is not as extreme as Markovits makes it out to be. Lawyers in our zealous
adversary system surely do regularly lie, cheat, and abuse, but I argue that
the adversary system does not intrinsically require any such behavior.
Second, I explain why I think the distinction between third-person and
first-person justificatory frameworks is implausible. I argue first that the
idea of first-person justification simply does not make philosophical sense.
I then argue that morality, or at least a Kantian take on morality, takes into
account both the partial and impartial perspectives. I wrap up this part of
the essay by exploring possible reasons why Markovits would fail to see
how Kantian morality can properly take partiality into account. I focus
particularly on the objection Markovits draws from Bernard Williams -
that Kantian morality cannot make sense of personal integrity - and on
Markovits's misreading of the Kantianism of Christine Korsgaard.
Third, I move from the ideal to the real. I offer an explanation for why
lawyers in the real world participate in a zealous adversary system. I
suggest that the ethically problematic behavior of good lawyers in the non-
ideal world is the result of a race to the bottom that, while deviating from
the ideal, is also, at least to some extent, unavoidable. I then suggest that
the moral picture that results is one in which the criticism directed at
lawyers can be taken as an indictment of the race to the bottom, and a call
for constant attention to the possibilities for structural reform to raise the
profession as close as possible to its ideal. But at some level it also
reflects the inherent moral difficulty that all good people have accepting
that the ends can justify the means.
I: ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN LAWYERING
A. The Underlying Causes of Problematic Partiality
Markovits thinks there are two distinct kinds of ethical problems that
lawyers confront: partiality and lawyerly vices. In this section, 1 argue
2004]
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that the problem Markovits identifies as partiality is really grounded in
two other problems, and that lawyers are not obliged to do anything that
would subject them to criticism on these grounds.
Markovits puts the charge of partiality, at its core, this way:
[L]awyers are called on to engage their talents in support of outcomes
their clients favor even when those outcomes are themselves unfair.
... [A] tort lawyer, for example, might help a client avoid liability by
pleading a technical defense involving a statute of limitations even
though she knows the client committed the tort in question and has a
moral duty to compensate the victim.9
Markovits seems to believe that if the adversary system can be justified,
then so can the partiality that comes with it.1" He does not say as much
explicitly, but the thrust of his argument as a whole is that even if the
system is impartially justified, lawyerly vices cannot be justified by that
kind of argument. The implication by contrast is that their partiality can
be justified.1" In other words, if an ideal system would be an adversary
system, then in the ideal system, "[1]awyers will remain advocates rather
than judges."12
As I just indicated, however, I think that the problem Markovits finds -
that of serving clients' interests even when doing so would be unfair and
would help them escape a moral duty - is not fundamentally a problem of
partiality. It is, instead, a two-pronged problem reflecting the gap between
law and morality, and the morally unjustifiable choice to serve clients in
the pursuit of immoral ends.
A little reflection on what judges must do shows that partiality could not
be the whole problem. Consider Markovits's example of a tort lawyer
who invokes the statute of limitations to prevent his client from having to
pay damages that he morally owes the plaintiff. If the lawyer makes that
case to the judge, and the judge agrees that the statute of limitations has
run, the judge then has a legal obligation to tell the plaintiff that he has no
9. Id. at 214-15 (first emphasis added; second in the original). David Luban offers a real case
along these lines: Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957), concerned "a wealthy man
attempting to evade a five thousand dollar debt to an 'old friend, countryman and former employee' by
pleading the statute of limitations." LUBAN, supra note 5, at 9.
10. Markovits does not commit himself in the main text to the view that the adversary system,
perhaps in some modified form, is or would be justified. He does say that "[n]early all the critics [of
the adversary system] agree (at least their positions entail) that some version of the adversary system
should remain in place." Markovits, supra note 1, at 264. But he does not embrace their view. On the
other hand, he says in a note, "I should say, however, that although I am sympathetic to the suggestion
that there is (much) too much adversariness in the practice of lawyering as it stands, I do believe that
some adversariness has intrinsic value and I am skeptical of efforts to eliminate adversariness from
lawyering altogether or to confine adversariness to such levels as can be defended, insecurely, by
purely pragmatic argument." Id. at 217 n. 18.
11. Markovits also notes that "the mainstay of academic legal ethics" - a position he does not
disavow - is that "the adversary lawyer's seemingly partial behavior is impartially justified because
the adversary system is impartially justified." Id. at 262.
12. 1d. at 265.
[Vol. 16:1
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legal remedy for his damages. The judge is meant to be the paradigm of
an impartial figure, yet he may be obliged to tell the morally deserving
plaintiff that he loses. If telling the morally deserving plaintiff that he
loses is the problem, then the problem is not one of partiality.
The problem as it concerns the judge and the lawyer obviously reflects
the gap between law and morality. This gap is not hard to explain. The
law relies on rules to guarantee certain values like efficiency and
predictability.' 3 More specifically, it adopts rules such as that one has to
file a suit within a fixed period of time in order to "giv[e] individuals
repose from ancient breaches of law."' 4 Rules of this sort limit a judge's
ability to look to the underlying moral values that justify a tort system in
the first place on a case by case basis. The law allows a limited amount of
flexibility in the name of equity. But as the Supreme Court has noted:
[P]rocedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access
to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague
sympathy for particular litigants .... In the long run, experience
teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified
by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration
of the law.1
5
Clearly this reasoning applies in state courts as well as federal. And the
upshot of adopting this reasoning is that some morally deserving plaintiffs
will be denied recovery by procedural bars such as a statute of limitations.
Such failures to provide a legal remedy may be unjust in particular cases,
but if judges had the legal power to overlook procedural bars, there is a
danger that they would undermine their point. The law has to decide what
discretion to give judges in what contexts. Cynical realists may argue that
judges have a choice whether to allow their discretion to be so controlled.
But any judge who takes the law seriously will be confronted with cases in
which he will feel that the law demands that he deny a party what that
party morally deserves.
I am not suggesting that judges are always morally obliged, or even
permitted, to follow the dictates of the law. Some laws are too far from
just. To take the most well-worn of examples, consider the fugitive slave
laws that operated in the U.S. prior to the Civil War. Arguably, judges
should have done more than they generally did to undermine or to refuse
to enforce such laws. 6 My point is only that there are some times when a
system of rule-like laws, even in an ideal form, cannot help but deviate
from morality. And in such cases, the moral value of the law as a
13. See FRED SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 137-49(1991).
14. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. Baldwin Country Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
2004]
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necessary system for social coordination and conflict resolution provides
moral justification for upholding the law even when it leads to an injustice
in a particular case.
One might suggest here that lawyers are in a different position from
judges because lawyers would do such things as making the argument that
a plaintiff cannot recover due to a statute of limitations even when it's not
true. But in an ideal adversary system, lawyers would make such an
argument only if the statute of limitations arguably does apply. In such
cases, they would be playing a crucial role in determining what the law is.
The lawyers on each side make the argument for why the statute of
limitations applies or does not apply so that the judge can weigh the
arguments and decide which is more compelling. For the judge to act with
legal integrity, the lawyers have to do that job. Thus, partiality does not
really seem implicated in the actions of the lawyer who argues for the
statute of limitations. In an ideal system, the lawyers on each side can be
seen more as aids to the judge who is trying to understand the law than as
zealous advocates, one of whom is serving an immoral client who wishes
to use the law to shirk a moral duty.
The problem with my response here is that it treats the lawyer too much
as though the ideal adversary lawyer is really a lawyer in an inquisitorial
regime. 7 Lawyers in adversary systems are officers of the court, and in an
ideal system would see their job as helping the court do its job well. But
they are also advocates, and indeed agents, for their clients. As agents,
they work on behalf of their clients, helping to achieve their clients' ends.
Thus, among the most basic rules of legal ethics, as codified by the
American Bar Association's Model Rules, is that, with certain limited
exceptions, "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation."' 8  If a lawyer cannot in good conscience
serve the objectives of a particular client, the lawyer should withdraw
from the client's service, rather than take it upon himself to deny the client
what might well be his legal rights.' 9
17. For a nice description of the differences between the roles of adversary and inquisitorial
lawyers, see LUBAN, supra note 5, at 93-103.
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1980). The primary exception is that "A
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent." Id. at R. 1.2(d).A lawyer also has discretion, after consultation, over "technical
and legal tactical issues." Id. at R. 1.2[11 cmt.
19. The ABA Model Rules say that a lawyer may withdraw from a case, even if his withdrawal
would have a materially adverse effect on the interests of the client, if the "client insists upon pursuing
an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." Id. at R.l.16(b)(3). The limit on this
right to withdraw is that it may not be exercised if the court orders the lawyer to continue representing
the client. See id. at R. 1.16(c).lt is also generally assumed that a lawyer will not be free to withdraw if
appointed by a court. See id. at R. 6.2.lndeed, a lawyer may turn down an appointment on moral
grounds only if "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." Id. at R. 6.2(c). Markovits
makes a lot of Rule 6.2, drawing the conclusion that "there even exist legal limits on a lawyer's right
to defer to her conscience in choosing her clients." Markovits, supra note 1, at 216 n.17. But he
[Vol. 16:1
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What distinguishes lawyers from judges, then, is an element of partiality
that comes with serving a particular client's partial interests. But
tempering any obligations that might arise out of this partiality is a
freedom to take or not to take a client's case that judges do not have. As
the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct says: "A judge shall hear and
decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification
is required."2 In other words, judges have no discretion. If a case is on a
judge's docket, he must either disqualify himself if so required, or hear the
case. Of course, certain appellate judges have at least a vote on deciding
whether to hear cases. It could be imagined that judges who feel that the
lower court ruled in a morally sound but legally unsound way would
refuse to hear the case on appeal and thereby use their discretion to avoid
applying the law when doing so would lead to an injustice. But such
opportunities are at best the exception for judges. They are the norm for
lawyers. Unless ordered by a court to serve a client,2 lawyers can choose
not to work with clients with immoral aims. Thus, the choice to advocate
for someone who wants to pursue immoral aims is normally the lawyer's
responsibility. He cannot pass it off on the law or on the adversary
system.
One might object on three grounds. First, one might object that lawyers
should not be judging the moral worth of their clients' ends. As Judge
George Sharswood said nearly 150 years ago, "The lawyer, who refuses
his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and
indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury."22 We may want
to allow such usurpation in extremely morally troubling cases. If the legal
rights are sufficiently egregious, then a lawyer may have a moral duty to
interfere. But in a run of the mill case of a client pursuing immoral but
legal ends, the lawyer has no more right than a judge to rectify the moral
failings of the law on a case by case basis. And he certainly should not
take himself to have even more freedom than a judge to undermine his
client's legal rights.
The problem with this objection is that it blurs the line between
interfering with the exercise of a legal right and failing to aid in the
exercise of a legal right. A lawyer who has not induced another person to
rely on him to that person's detriment, and who is not for some other
reason legally obliged to help that other exploit the other's legal rights -
and who refuses to help the other unfairly or immorally exploit rights
neglects the fact that Rule 6.2 applies only in the criminal context, for which special reasons exist to
serve morally disturbing clients. See text infra in this section.
20. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(1) (1990). Disqualification arises when "the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. at Canon 3(E)(1).
2 1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R- 1.16(c) and 6.2.
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granted by the law - does not interfere with the exercise of those rights.
The person in search of a lawyer's help is free to go elsewhere. And even
if, contra human nature, all lawyers were to refuse to argue for a client,
and the client were left either to argue for himself or to abandon his case,
this should not be viewed as too harsh a prospect. For were it to be the
case that no lawyer would take a client's case - and were this fact to
reflect the independent judgment of all lawyers, rather than a conspiracy
of some sort, or the existence of a threat - the case would have to be so
clearly heinous that all would agree that it is morally improper to satisfy it.
How could it be unethical to deny a client help in such circumstances?2 3
A second objection would be that it is often morally worthwhile to help
clients who have immoral ends. Two kinds of examples come readily to
mind. First, in the civil context, there are those who want to exercise an
important right, even though they want to exercise it in a morally
repugnant way. Consider, for example, an obnoxious group seeking to put
on an offensive parade. Vindicating such a group's free speech rights can
be justified by the value of protecting such rights against a possibly overly
censorious state. Second, there are criminal cases in which the lawyer
defends a person he believes or even knows to be guilty. Even if one
knows that one's client is guilty, it is important to put on a defense in
order to keep the power of the police state in check.2 4 In both cases, one
helps people secure immoral ends: parading offensively and avoiding
deserved punishment. Thus, it might be thought that it was morally naive
to conclude that one should not serve clients with immoral ends.
The problem with this objection is that it over-generalizes a more
limited point. Yes, there are classes of cases in which lawyers can morally
serve clients with immoral ends. But those are cases in which some other
important social goal is at stake. The service a lawyer provides in those
cases can be justified despite the immoral ends because of the
counterbalancing moral ends. If those other ends were missing, then the
lawyer could have no such justification for working on behalf of a client's
immoral ends. In the tort case that I started this section by discussing,
there is no other moral goal that would justify serving the client.
Some may believe that the importance of providing people with the
means of vindicating their legal rights is itself always reason enough for a
lawyer to offer her legal services to a client. But that claim is too
23. In a sufficiently homogenous society, we could imagine no lawyer would take a deserving
case because all mistakenly believe that it is undeserving. Imagine a sexist society in which a woman
sues to be able to exercise some liberty reserved only for men. But I assume that in a society as large
and heterogeneous as ours, no position that can plausibly be morally defended would lack for
defenders. Indeed, the problem is that no position, no matter how heinous, would lack for defenders.
24. To be fair to criminal defense lawyers, their job is not simply to try to gain an acquittal for
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sweeping to be plausible. As already noted, the law sometimes deviates
from morality. It sometimes allows people to do things that they ought not
to do. A judge may be obliged to rule with the law. But a lawyer cannot
plausibly take herself to have a similarly strong reason to help a person
vindicate legal rights he ought not to exercise. A page from Abraham
Lincoln's legal practice illustrates this point better than I possibly could.
Speaking to a potential client, Lincoln once said:
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and
her six fatherless children and thereby get you six hundred dollars to
which you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it
appears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it does to
you. You must remember that some things legally right are not
morally right. We shall not take your case, but will give you a little
advice for which we will charge you nothing. You seem to be a
sprightly, energetic man; we would advise you to try your hand at
making six hundred dollars in some other way.25
A third objection is that it is unrealistic to expect lawyers not to serve
clients with immoral ends. As David Luban puts the point, assuming that
the lawyer in question has already been working with a client, "resignation
is a very drastic step, causing the lawyer financial loss, generating hard
feelings, and tagging her with a reputation as a quitter., 26 This practical
issue may indeed excuse certain lawyers in marginal cases. But the scope
of the practical problems here should not be exaggerated. One will not be
tagged as a quitter for not taking on clients with immoral ends. Nor would
one be tagged a quitter for dumping a few clients who prove to be
unscrupulous. People sever such business relations all the time. One
might be tagged as a quitter if one dumped clients on a regular basis, but
then one should probably be more particular in choosing one's clients in
the first place.
As for hard feelings, even if they might arise, it is worth questioning
how much they matter if the person who will have them is a client bent on
pursuing immoral ends. Doubtless, the "sprightly energetic" man whom
Lincoln addressed came away from the meeting with some "hard
feelings." But so it must sometimes be.
This leaves the financial aspect of Luban's pragmatic argument. Young
25. 2 WILLIAM HERNDON & JESSE WEIK, HERNDON'S LINCOLN, 345 (1889), cited in LUBAN,
supra note 5, at 174.
26. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 159. To be clear, Luban is not arguing that one should serve a client's
immoral ends. Rather, he thinks one should keep one's client and refuse to pursue his unjust ends. I
don't know what Luban would say to the rebuttal that this can't help much; instead of lawyers
resigning, clients would fire their lawyers. Perhaps he thinks lawyers should be somewhat devious
about their refusal. But that obviously raises a whole new set of ethical issues, and seems implausible
in all but extreme cases of unscrupulous clients.
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lawyers, fresh out of law school and heavily in debt, may feel that they
have no choice but to work at a firm where, again, they may feel that they
have no choice but to work on the projects the firm assigns them to work
on. Again, however, we should be wary of exaggerating the scope of the
problem. Most firms allow associates to decline to work on morally
problematic cases, and most law graduates are not economically coerced
into working for firms that would not give them such freedom. But in
those possible rare cases in which young lawyers arc essentially coerced
into serving undeserving clients, the blame can be shifted onto the partners
in the firm for taking on such clients and for failing to give associates the
choice not to serve them.
In sum, the proactive choice to serve unscrupulous clients is, I think, the
real source of worry about the partiality of lawyers. But this choice is not
fundamentally a problem of partiality. Yes, a lawyer is problematically
partial insofar as he chooses to advocate on behalf of someone whose ends
are morally undeserving of aid. But the underlying problem is the lack of
good moral judgment in deciding to work with a client who does not
deserve the aid. There are a number of reasons a lawyer might make such
a moral mistake. Perhaps she is greedy and wants the money. Perhaps she
is overly ambitious and values too highly the opportunity to get a
challenging victory and discounts too readily the disvalue of the harm she
helps to perpetrate. Perhaps she operates under a false ideology according
to which she has an obligation to serve any client who can pay, no matter
how noxious his goals. Whatever the cause of the mistake, the problem
here really precedes partiality - it is the immoral choice to serve clients
who do not deserve the benefits of a partial advocate. This kind of choice
is neither required by nor excused by practicing law in an adversary
system. Indeed, whether the system is ideal or zealous, responsibility for
aiding an undeserving client rests with the individual lawyer who chooses
to do so.
B. Unsportsmanlike Conduct Underlying Lawyerly Vices
Markovits wants to emphasize that even if lawyerly partiality can be
justified by justifying the adversary system, there are various lawyerly
vices that are still morally problematic. What are these lawyerly vices?
Markovits's triad is lying, cheating, and abusing. These would persist,
Markovits believes, even in an ideal adversary system because lawyers
"will continue to persuade others of arguments they do not themselves
believe, to exploit unfair strategic advantages, and to discredit and attack
honorable and truthful opponents."27 Markovits claims that these things
that they would be obliged to do in their professional capacity are vices
27. Markovits, supra note 1, at 265.
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because such acts "would ordinarily be immoral."28
Now there is no denying that the tendency to lie, cheat, and abuse would
indeed be a character defect and thus vicious. But it is worth pointing out
that it is at least odd to say that doing these things is vicious if one does
these things only when one is obliged to do them. It is conceivable that
they would be justified as acts, yet would be done in a vicious way. But
the more natural expression of vice is through a tendency to do things that
are, as a matter of fact, unjustified. Markovits presents this less natural
picture of vice because he thinks we need to carve off character issues
from the justification of behavior. He assumes, at least for the sake of
argument, that these behaviors are impartially justified, and his strategy
for explaining how these actions can be both obligatory and worthy of
criticism is that they are also expressions of vice. But, as I will argue in
Part II of this paper, Markovits's strategy of carving morality up into
possibly competing domains of justification trades on a species of
philosophical nonsense. On my view, then, these behaviors are not best
seen as vices. On my view, they are morally problematic because there is
at least some ethical strain involved in justifying them. 9
In this section, I start with a preliminary question: Are these behaviors
even called for by adversarial legal practice? My answer is that in an ideal
adversary system, they are not called for. The view that they are called for
is, in essence, a view that embraces poor sportsmanship. Poor
sportsmanship represents, I believe, a perverse norm that has been
generally embraced in our zealous adversary system. But that shows only
how far we have deviated from the ideal.
To see whether lying, cheating, and abusing are really called for in the
adversary system, we need to be clear on what these terms really mean.
Unlike Markovits, I do not think we can talk about "redescribing" the
actions in question in a way that leaves some conflicting description
applying as well.3" Actions may be capable of many descriptions, but the
various descriptions should all be consistent. My concern here is not with
redescription but with accurate description - with accurately using the
labels "lying," "cheating," and "abusing." It is inaccurate to say that a
surgeon assaults a patient who has consented to the surgery in question,
even though he cuts her. Likewise, it is inaccurate to say that a boxer
commits a battery upon his opponent, even though he batters him.3 And
28. Id. at 213.
29. 1 explore why and in what sense these behaviors are morally unjustified, given that they are
also sometimes obligatory, in Part I11.
30. Markovits thinks lawyers can take advantage of redescription to try to save their moral
integrity from the first-person point of view. See, especially, id. at 275-76. Because I think the first-
person point of view is actually nonsense, I reject Markovits's use of redescription in it, as well.
31. Markovits misrepresents this issue when he says, "Prize-fighters... think of themselves as
boxing rather than assaulting their opponents." Id. At 275 (emphasis added).The implication is that
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it is inaccurate to say that an actor lies when she speaks in the first person
on stage and makes claims that are not true in the real world. Question: is
it likewise inaccurate to say, for example, that a lawyer who tries to
convince others of arguments that she does not herself believe is lying?
I think the answer is yes. The charges that Markovits levels are
inaccurate, at least in the ideal adversary system. Markovits anticipates
the kinds of arguments I am about to give to that effect.32 But he thinks
that there is another point of view from which lawyers, even in the ideal
adversary system, will still be lying, cheating, and abusing.33 I think that
is mistaken.
I start with the charge of lying. When a lawyer makes an argument
about the law, he argues that a certain law should or should not be
controlling in the case at hand. Suppose he thinks that the position he
takes is, as a matter of fact, the weaker of the two positions. Were he the
judge, he would rule for the other side. Does that make him a liar? I think
not. We should not interpret his argument as a statement of what the
lawyer actually believes is true, but as an attempt, at least in an ideal
adversary system, to put the argument on one side as convincingly as
possible. It is, in a way, acting. It might be clearer if the lawyer prefaced
his remarks by saying: "I am now going to give the best argument I can
for the view that this law should apply in this case, but I warn you not to
conclude that I personally accept the argument I am about to express."
But there is no need for such a preface. People familiar with the context
of legal argument know that this disclaimer applies just as people familiar
with theatre know that actors often do not personally endorse the things
they say on stage. And if the intent is not to deceive in this way, then the
act is not properly called a lie.
Now a lawyer in our real world might not limit himself to making the
argument as rationally convincing as possible. He might also play on the
emotions of the judge. Or, more likely, when presenting the facts to a
jury, the lawyer may be tempted to try various techniques more designed
to mislead than to inform, such as appealing to racial stereotypes, racial
fears, or racial solidarity; putting on weeping witnesses; or showing gory
photographs to engage the jury's sympathy or indignation. Judges have an
obligation to monitor their courtrooms so that the evidence and arguments
offered appeal to reason and avoid the distorting effect of appeals to
emotions. But many lawyers will seek to push that line, hoping to get
away with crossing it as often as possible. They thus seek to mislead the
others rightly think of boxers as assaulting their opponents, but this is false. Although there are many
accurate ways to describe the situation (hitting, boxing, trying to defeat, etc.), assaulting is not among
them.
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jury and to undermine its capacity to act as a reliable fact finder.
Although such techniques may not literally count as lying, they may have
much the same effect of leading the audience to a false conclusion. Such
techniques have an obvious place in a zealous advocacy system. They
have, however, no place in an ideal adversary system.
I turn now to the charge of abuse. To abuse a witness is to treat her in a
way that she should not be treated. So the question is: do witnesses have a
right not to be treated in the way they are treated during cross-
examination? In the ideal adversary system, I think the answer is no. A
lawyer may believe that the witness whom he examines is truthful and
honorable. But the nature of a trial is to ensure as much. The fact finder
needs to see whether the witness's story stands up to pressure. The
lawyer's job is to provide that pressure. This requires the lawyer to probe
the various ways the witness's story can be doubted, which includes
probing the character of the witness insofar as doing so is relevant to the
witness's credibility and is not likely to be more prejudicial than
probative.34 The lawyer should not be taken to be attacking the witness
personally, to be literally impugning her character or veracity. The lawyer
should be taken as exposing any grounds for doubt that the law, as
equitably interpreted, considers it appropriate to expose, so that the judge
or jurors can make up their mind or minds. The experience may be
unpleasant, even offensive, to the witness. But the witness has no right
not to be so treated in that context. Just as presenting an argument in the
strongest possible light - even if the lawyer thinks it is the weaker
argument - is not lying, so cross-examining a witness, even one that the
lawyer believes to be truthful and honorable, is not abusing.
Again, a lawyer in our real world might not limit himself to cross-
examining in ways that point out only the rational grounds for doubting
the veracity and reliability of a witness. Consider the practice - reined in
only in recent years by rape-shield laws35 - of bringing up the sexual
history of a woman who claims to have been raped. Defense attorneys'
would argue that the woman could not be trusted to be moral enough to
tell the truth, or even to reject an offer of sex by the defendant, if she was
otherwise having extra-marital sex. This argument might have resonated
with juries far beyond its rational merits. Insofar as that was the problem,
such a tactic fits into the previous concern with lying. But exposing a
woman's sexual history on the witness stand raises another issue, as well:
it would have kept women from coming forward to report rapes. The
danger of their sexual behavior being outed would be too intimidating. In
that way, this tactic, which serves little or no legitimate role in
34. See FED. R. EVID. 608 (regarding impeaching the character of witnesses) and 403 (regarding
the need for evidence to be more probative than prejudicial).
35. For federal courts, the rape-shield law is embodied by FED. R. EvID. 412.
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determining the actual guilt or innocence of defendants, would have
counted as witness, or potential witness, abuse.
One might argue that since the advent of rape-shield laws, this tactic is a
thing of the past. But that position is mistaken in two ways. First, rape-
shield laws contain exceptions for introducing a woman's sexual history.
In the federal law, in a criminal trial, a woman's sexual history with
respect to particular people can be introduced into evidence "to prove
consent."36 This kind of exception can eat the rule if not handled with
care. Second, even if we grant that rape-shield laws are fairly effective,
they only remove one kind of witness abuse. They don't change the
underlying attitude. This attitude is that every tactic that is not against the
law - and that seems more likely to help than to hurt one's client - should
be used. If this means badgering witnesses, or introducing embarrassing
but logically irrelevant facts, to make them either back down or seem
unreliable, then the zealous lawyer will use these tactics, Again, judges
have an obligation to monitor their courtrooms so that witnesses are not
mistreated. But many lawyers will seek to push the line, hoping to get
away with crossing it as often as possible. Again, however, abusing
witnesses is the kind of technique that I think lawyers in an ideal
adversary system would put aside.
This leaves the charge of cheating, or exploiting unfair strategic
advantages. Again, we need to be careful with terminology. Literally,
cheating is violating the rules of a game or competition to gain an unfair
advantage. Using the rules to win is not cheating. But Markovits's point
can't be dismissed that quickly. Taking advantage of unfair rules, or gaps
in the rules, although not literally cheating, is clearly morally problematic
and may operate on the same level as cheating. Consider the story of how
Clarence Darrow used to try to distract juries when the other side was
making its closing argument: he would unfold a paper clip, stick it down a
cigar, and then smoke the cigar which would get an unnaturally long ash
on the end. Once someone in the jury noticed the ash hanging off the end
of the cigar in a way that it should not have been able to do, the jurors as a
group would tend to focus on the ash rather than on the other side's
argument.37 Clearly, this is a form of cheating.
The question is, how are we to understand strategic moves generally?
Are they generally cheating, like Darrow's ash? Clearly not. I suggest,
however, that there is a difference, one not always easy to discern,
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of strategy. Appeal to procedural
36. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1)(B).
37. This story is repeated by Michael Craig in Law and the Cigar, CIGAR AFICIONADO
<<http://www.cigarafeionado.com/Cigar/CA-Archives/CA-Show-Article/0,2322,493,OO.html>>(No
v./Dec. 1997). Thanks to Athena Dahl for finding this citation to support a story that I picked up long
ago, who knows where.
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bars such as the statute of limitations is clearly within the non-cheating
end of the spectrum. If the law says that a plaintiff has, say, two years to
sue, and the plaintiff does not sue in that time, then he has no legal right to
recovery. On the other end of the spectrum are phony counterclaims,
sometimes known as "SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation) suits, which aim merely to bankrupt plaintiffs who do not
have deep pockets.3 8 In the middle are things like discovery requests that
have marginal relevance to the case, but that also serve to bog down one's
opponent and thereby gain from him a more favorable settlement than one
would otherwise get.
It is this murky middle area where the charge of cheating may seem to
be most problematic, for it is there that it may seem that something like
cheating would go on even in an ideal adversary system. On the one hand,
even in an ideal adversary system, lawyers may have an obligation to use
any legal resources that have legitimate relevance to the case at hand. If
the law allows a party discovery, and if the discovery requested in a
particular case is actually relevant to arguing the case, then the lawyer
should feel obliged to make the discovery request. Moreover, negotiated
settlements cannot fail to reflect the best available alternatives that each
side has. If one side is in a weak position, that party cannot expect to get
as much from a negotiated settlement as a party negotiating from a
position of relative strength. On the other hand, to let a party's inability to
endure a lawsuit determine what substantive rights that party has is surely
a moral failing of the law. It may be an inevitable failing in a free society
in which people will necessarily have different amounts of wealth and
power, but exploiting that failing in the law smells like cheating.
Is there any way for a lawyer in an ideal system to serve her clients as
they deserve to be served and to avoid engaging in behavior that smells
like cheating? I think the answer is yes, and the solution is analogous to
that offered in the previous section. A lawyer should feel free not to serve
an unscrupulous client, and unless there is some serious moral value
hanging in the balance, a lawyer should feel obliged not to serve an
unscrupulous client. In the previous section, our concern was with a client
pursuing immoral ends. Here the concern is with a client wanting his
lawyer to use unfair means to gain an unfair advantage in the pursuit of
what may be an otherwise morally justifiable end. I am suggesting that
these positions should be treated as on a par. The thought is that a morally
reasonable client would not seek to exploit unfair advantages which he
happens to have under the law. And a lawyer should feel free to resign the
38. The term "SLAPP suit" was coined by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan. See generally
Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and
Qualitative Approaches 22 LAW & SoC'Y. REV. 385 (1988). See also Davis v. American Taxpayer's
Alliance, 125 CAL.RPTR.2d 534 (2002).
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case rather than exploit unfair advantages for an unscrupulous client. I am
not suggesting that lawyers should refuse to help clients enrich themselves
in ways that may, in some cosmic sense, be unfair. But if a particular
settlement of a particular dispute would clearly amount to exploitation of
an unfair advantage such that a moral client would not push for it, then a
lawyer should not help an unscrupulous client obtain it.39
Again, we can contrast the ideal adversary system with the zealous one.
In the zealous system, "cheating" is the name of the game. Indeed, one
can look at lying and abusing as just two instances of cheating. Almost
every tool available to lawyers can be, and often is, abused. Discovery
was meant to allow parties to obtain from each other information relevant
to legal disputes, but now it is often abused in two ways. Meaningless
discovery motions can be made to drive up the expenses of the other party,
and, from the other side, parties can comply by sending over huge
volumes of material that the other side will have to sort through at great
expense to use. Peremptory challenges, which allow lawyers to strike
potential jurors from the jury, exist in theory to allow lawyers to rely on
their inarticulate gut-level reads of people to exclude jurors who will be
unfair to their client. But peremptories are in practice used by each side to
try to get rid of jurors who will not be biased in their favor. Choice of
forum is afforded parties to try to make trials mutually convenient, but the
power to choose the forum is often used either to make litigation too
difficult for one party to endure, or to pick a forum in which the choosing
party is likely to have an advantage, even an unfair one.4" Frivolous
counter-suits are often abused in the form of SLAPP suits to force
plaintiffs to abandon legitimate lawsuits. The list goes on.
The problem arises at many levels. At one level, it reflects the fact, as
David Luban puts it, that "the law is inherently double-edged: any rule
imposed to limit zealous advocacy ... may be used by an adversary as an
offensive weapon."41 At another level, it reflects the zealous nature of our
adversary system. The ethos of that system is to try to win in any way that
one can get away with. As noted above, the model for this zealous system
is poor sportsmanship. Sports all have rules that define the game and
39. One might wonder whether my point here applies in the case of criminal defense. I think it
does not apply in a straightforward way. If, for example, the government is strapped for cash, or in
need of information that only a particular defendant has, the defendant's lawyer should use that
leverage to get as good a deal as possible for her client. If we start with the assumption that a defense
lawyer's job is to keep the state in check and not to judge the guilt or desert of her client, then there is
no way to determine when the state should be given a break. It is up to the state to decide what its
priorities are and to provide the resources to investigate and prosecute crimes. It is not up to the
defense attorney to help the state out of a bind at the expense of her client.
40. For example, much large tort litigation against major corporate defendants is brought in
obscure backwaters where juries are known to award plaintiffs large sums of money, arguably much
larger sums than the plaintiffs really deserve.
41. LUBAN, supra note 5, at 51.
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determine what counts as cheating. But almost all human activity is too
complicated to be governed by mechanical rules. Some level of judgment
is almost always brought to bear. Nowadays, we tend to think of poor
sportsmanship in narrow terms, primarily in the sense of being a sore loser
or a disrespectful winner, but the notion is really broader than that. It has
to do with treating the rules as Holmes's bad man treats the law. A bad
sportsman seeks to win in ways that violate the spirit of the rules and the
game. For example, he tries to find drugs that will enhance his
performance in an illicit way but that cannot yet be caught by drug testers.
Such is the behavior of a cheater - and of zealous adversary lawyers.
But again, that is not how it has to be, not in the ideal sense. In the ideal
sense, lawyers would be good sports. They would neither lie, nor cheat,
nor abuse. They would be no more ready to use unscrupulous means on
their clients' behalf than they would be ready to do an unscrupulous
client's immoral business.
There is a difference between the conclusion of this section and the last,
however. I said at the end of the last section that the choice to serve
unscrupulous clients was always a lawyer's choice and a lawyer's
responsibility. A lawyer cannot fob that responsibility off on the existence
of the adversary system, not even if it takes the shape of our current
zealous adversary system. The same cannot necessarily be said for the
problems of poor sportsmanship - of cheating and the other abuses. In the
non-ideal zealous adversary system, one may have to play dirty to stay
competitive. This is a real problem, and there may not be a real solution.
Indeed, it seems a rather long-lasting problem as lawyers have been
reviled for their cheating and misleading methods from at least the time of
Plato.42
I will, in Part III, explain why this problem arises. That is, I will explain
why the problem is one of more or less intractable non-ideal theory. I will
also try to offer an account of the ethical significance of the problem. But
first I want to explain, in Part II, why Markovits's conception of first-
person ethics is not helpful in understanding the problem of how cheating
can be both obligatory - even if only in the non-ideal real world - and
worthy of criticism. And I want to defend the use of Kantian ethics
against his criticism that it cannot adequately handle the proper role of
partiality and integrity in our moral lives.
42. Socrates is himself ironically accused of the "crime" of acting like a lawyer when, in the
Apology, he is charged with, among other things, making "the weaker argument appear the stronger."
PLATO, Apology, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 5 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961)
(the quoted phrase actually appears twice on the page).
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II: THE IMPLAUSIBLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON
ETHICS
A. First-Person Justification Makes No Sense
At the core of Markovits's paper is the thought that there are two
independent domains of ethical justification, the first-personal and the
third-personal. These, Markovits claims, can lead to "independent, and
possibly divergent, demands."43 Importantly, contrary to the title of the
second section of Markovits's paper, "Two Ethical Points of View," he is
not merely discussing two points of view that one who is thinking about
ethics can take on one and the same subject matter - he is not merely
describing the same thing from different perspectives. Rather, he is
talking about possibly conflicting demands that arise from different
domains of "justification."'
The problem with this dichotomy is that the idea of first-person
justification, as Markovits uses it, makes no sense. He uses it as a kind of
private space for justification, dealing in reasons that may matter only to
the agent, and even worse, dealing in reasons that need to make sense only
to the agent. Thus, he says things like: "The only person this form of role-
based redescription must persuade is the lawyer who employs it to
preserve his integrity.... "4 5  "When a person ... engages in integrity-
preserving role-based redescription, she may proceed in the first-person,
addressing only herself. '4 6 "The lawyer ... who employs role-based
redescription to preserve his integrity need not worry that his accusers
continue to reject the values and descriptions in terms of which he
conceives of his activities as long only as he finds these values and
descriptions persuasive himself."4 7  All of these quotes deal with role-
based redescription, an ethical move that Markovits thinks can help people
reconcile the demands of first-person ethics with those of third-person
ethics. But that is not what I am concerned with here. My immediate
concern is with the fact that Markovits thinks that description, persuasion,
and justification can be addressed to an audience of one or more, but not
all.
The problem with such notions has been the subject of much of the most
important work in epistemology in the twentieth century. Perhaps the
most famous attack against this way of thinking comes from Ludwig
Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations.48 Wittgenstein starts
43. Markovits, supra note 1, at 222.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 284
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id. at 287-88.
48. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (E. Anscombe trans., 1958).
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what is known as "the private language argument" - i.e., the argument
against the possibility of a private language - by imagining someone who
tries to construct a private concept for a private sensation.49 This person
writes an "S" in a calendar every day that he has this particular
sensation.50 Wittgenstein then asks:
What reason have we for calling 'S' the sign for a sensation? For
'sensation' is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible
to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification
which everybody understands. - And it would not help either to say
that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes 'S', he has
something - and that is all that can be said. 'Has' and 'something'
also belong to our common language.5 1
The point is this: for S to be a sign for a private concept, the speaker still
has to be able to say what it is a concept of. But once he starts down that
road, he is on the road to using a public language, full of public concepts.
Wilfred Sellars made essentially the same point in his landmark essay,
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Discussing someone who
claims to know that he sees green, Sellars says: "The essential point is that
in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in
the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what
one says."52 What is it to be in a "space of reasons"? It is to be able to
deploy a whole battery of concepts related to the concept that one is using.
For example, to be able to say that something is green, one has to be able
to distinguish colors from shapes and textures; one has to be able to
discuss proper lighting, because a green thing may not look green in the
wrong light; etc. And again, the point about publicity is that such
justifications do not take place in a private language. They take place in
the public sphere of shared experience and shared language.
Markovits can reply that he is not talking about strictly private
description, persuasion, and justification. Rather, it is his view that "very
few people have the imagination and force of personality to create a
genuine role all on their own."53  He is, therefore, not suggesting that
(most) people can use a private language for justification. Instead, it is his
view that most people can adopt a kind of first-personal justification only
by being part of a rich culture in which such justifications are accepted.5 4
49. The private language argument is typically located in §§ 258-302.
50. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 48, at § 258.
51- Id. at §261.
52. WILFRED SELLARS, EMPIRICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 76 (1997) (§36) (emphasis
added).
53. Markovits, supra note 1, at 286 n.139.
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But his point is, nonetheless, that these forms of justification are
immune to criticism from those outside the group, and that they are so
immune because the justification matters only to those who embrace the
relevant concepts. Thus, Markovits does embrace relativism of conceptual
scheme. And this kind of relativism fares no better than the more extreme
relativism of a private language.
Indeed, the private language argument was generalized to cover
conceptual relativism by another of the most important philosophers of the
twentieth century, Donald Davidson. In his essay, "On the Very Idea of a
Conceptual Scheme," Davidson discusses the idea of a conceptual scheme
that is somehow so different from other conceptual schemes that it cannot
be translated.5 As he puts it, "[c]onceptual relativism is a heady and
exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it." 56 Why
can't we make sense of it? Davidson's argument is essentially that any
evidence that others are using a radically different conceptual scheme
would have to be presented in such a way that we would have reason to
accept that they are using a conceptual scheme of some sort. This would
require making sense of others as concept users, engaged in practices like
describing and justifying. But then we would have to make sense of their
activities in our conceptual scheme. As Davidson notes:
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing
points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different
points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate
system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system
belies the claim of dramatic incomparability. 7
The point is not that people cannot have different conceptions of the
world, but that we are all dealing with the same world, and any one
language for describing the world has to be the kind of thing that others
can learn to understand too. Indeed, even to make sense of others as
having a language and using concepts, we have to be able to make sense
of their behavior, which commits us to "count[ing] them right in most
matters."5" And this commits us to viewing them as using concepts that
are ultimately translatable into ours.
An implication of the intertranslatability of different languages or
conceptual schemes is that when we learn to understand the conceptual
schemes others use, and we reject some of the claims made in them, then
there is a straightforward question of who is right. Think, for example, of
the belief some may hold that spirits, rather than germs, cause sickness.
55- Reprinted in DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183-98
(1984).
56. Id. at 183.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Id. at 197.
[Vol. 16:1
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss1/1
Walen
People who accept the authority of modem science reject the claim that
there is some conceptual scheme in which it is true that spirits cause
disease. They think that people who hold that view, insofar as it is
different from the view that one's mental states can cause sickness, are
simply mistaken. Of course, it is conceptually possible that diseases are
caused by both spirits and germs, or by neither. But whatever the truth is,
it is the truth for everyone. The question of who is right cannot really be
avoided with "heady" talk of truths for some and not for others.
If these arguments, which I have just briefly summarized, are right, then
Markovits's claim that description, persuasion, and justification can be
addressed to an audience of one, or of some few but not all, makes no
sense. Contrary to what Markovits says, a lawyer must in some sense
worry if others reject his descriptions of what he does. For to reject
descriptions is to say that they do not really apply. This kind of claim
cannot be true for one and not for another. It is either true or not.
Likewise, one should be concerned if one can persuade only oneself that
one is behaving well. Justification and persuasion are public acts, using a
shared language. If others are not persuaded that one is behaving well,
then somebody, or perhaps everybody, is missing something.
It might be objected that I have taken arguments that apply to the realm
of science and misapplied them to the realm of ethics. Drawing on Kant's
distinction between practical and theoretical reason, one might suggest
that persuasion can be relative to a community (or, for the extraordinary
person, only to oneself) in the practical realm, even if not in the theoretical
realm. But this is certainly not as Kant would have seen the distinction.
For him, both practical and theoretical reason are just different
applications of reason.59 And indeed, it is hard to see not only why but
how we should take ourselves to use concepts like justification,
persuasion, and description differently when dealing with practical issues
than when dealing with theoretical issues. Finally, this suggestion is also
incompatible with Markovits's view of third-person ethics as involving the
same kind of universal justification used in theoretical reason. For this
suggestion to help Markovits, then, it would have to be the case that a
certain kind of ethical reasoning involves essentially degenerate,
relativistic notions of justification, persuasion, and description. I find this
impossible to credit.
To be clear, I am not rejecting the thought that ethical disputes are hard
to resolve. Clearly, they often cannot be resolved by appeal to empirical
research the way many other kinds of questions can. And disputes
59. "[W]e should be able.., to show the unity of practical and theoretical reason in a common
principle, since in the end there can only be one and the same reason, which must be differentiated
solely in its application." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 59 (H.J.
Paton ed., 1964) (Academy page 391).
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between conflicting ethical views are often very recalcitrant. These facts
lead some - for example, Richard Posner - to conclude that ethical
argument is nothing but more or less thinly veiled attempts to promote
one's own preferences over those of others.6' But I find that view too
dismissive of the ethical convictions most of us have. We think certain
actions are right and good, and others wrong and bad. And we try our best
to make sense of those judgments by appealing to basic moral principles,
and by showing how these principles cohere with other judgments we
make, and with basic facts about human nature and the world in which we
live.61 Ultimately, we may not succeed in persuading others very often,
but then again, the same thing can be said for scientists when rival theories
vie for adherents.61 Science too must appeal to judgments about what kind
of theory makes most sense, and these judgments are no more empirically
grounded than moral judgments. Ultimately, in both the practical and the
theoretical realms, reason is left with appeals to judgment, and on matters
ofjudgment, reasonable people will differ. But that should not be taken to
impugn the aspirations of reason to describe the one world we all share.
I also don't mean to deny that different people care about different
things. For example, I may care a lot about fitness and little about dress,
and another may care a lot about dress and little about fitness. Neither of
us need make any claims that the other should reject, however. We can
make sense of our each caring about different things by reference to other
differences between us - e.g. different histories, different sensitivities, and
different talents - that allow us to make sense of these differences in a
common framework for justification. If one of us does make claims that
the other rejects, however, then we have a real dispute in which at least
one of us must be wrong.
This way of handling difference is in sharp contrast to Markovits's
picture of how a lawyer should view moral differences from the first-
person perspective. Markovits imagines a lawyer who makes claims about
how to describe what he is doing that others could very well reject as false
or as inadequate justifications for his actions. But Markovits thinks he
should treat his predicament as if the only question is whether he has the
strength of character to like what he likes despite others' not joining him
in this matter of taste.
Finally, by way of clarification, I am not denying that different people
can legitimately have different moral options open to them with regard to
60. Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1638
(1998).
61. This is the process John Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 48 (1971).
62. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 150-52 (2d ed. 1970)
(discussing the fact that scientists often are not converted to a new "paradigm," and that the arguments
which persuade some to change their minds do not amount to "proof").
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the same set of effects. Consider a variation on the moral case that
Markovits discusses, that of Jim meeting a dictator who gives him the
choice to kill one person himself in order to prevent the dictator from
killing all twenty.63 In the variation on the case, Jim has to kill another
innocent person - call him John - who is not already threatened by the
dictator, in order to save twenty threatened by the dictator. I introduce this
variation because it is clearer in this example than in the original that Jim
may not kill the one. His doing so would not be a Pareto improvement - it
would shift the threat to John in a way that almost all would regard as
impermissible. Now the person whose moral options are different from
Jim's, given the same set of possible effects, is John. Although it is clear
that Jim may not choose to kill the one to save the twenty, John
presumably does have the right to sacrifice himself if by doing so he could
save the twenty. That is, imagine that the dictator told both Jim and John
that if John were to die, he, the dictator, would release the twenty
unharmed. It is impermissible for Jim to choose to trade John's life for the
twenty, but it is presumably permissible - indeed presumably heroic - for
John to trade John's life for the twenty.
This variation with Jim and John does not show that they each confront
different and conflicting moral truths. Indeed, all should agree on 'that
Jim may not sacrifice John, but that John may sacrifice John. Amartya
Sen describes this as positional objectivity. 6' Positional objectivity makes
perfect sense. It involves no commitment to private or culturally relative
domains of justification. Private or culturally relative domains of
justification, however, make no sense.
B. Morality Takes into Account the Partial and the Impartial Perspectives
The previous section can be summarized this way: "[T]he only reasons
that are possible are the reasons we can share." These are the words with
which Christine Korsgaard ends the postscript to her essay, "The Reasons
We Can Share."65 Markovits discusses this essay at some length, but fails
to take the point. Instead, he mistakenly thinks he needs to describe a
domain of first-personal justification because he interprets the rest of
ethics as fundamentally concerned with impartiality to the exclusion of the
partiality we all naturally and properly take toward our own affairs.
My aim in this section is to demonstrate that Markovits takes too narrow
a view of the rest of morality. It is true that utilitarian or consequentialist
moral theories (from here on, I use the term "utilitarian" to cover all such
63. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 226 (introducing this scenario, which was originally created
by Bernard Williams). I discuss the case in greater detail below.
64. Amartya Sen, Positional Objectivity, 22 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 126 (1993).
65. Christine Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 275 -310 (1996).
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teleological theories) make all moral justification depend on an impartial
concern with maximizing the good from some impartial point of view.
Insofar as partiality can ever be justified on those theories, it is
instrumentally - as a means of achieving some impartially justified goal.
But Kantian moral theories do not operate the same way. Indeed, as one
leading contemporary Kantian, Thomas Nagel, has put it, the Kantian
moment in ethics is based on the question: "What, if anything, can we all
agree that we should do, given that our motives are not merely
impersonal?"6 6  He continues describing the Kantian standpoint: "[I]t
attempts to see things simultaneously from each individual's point of view
and to arrive at a form of motivation which [people] can all share, instead
of simply replacing the individual perspectives by an impersonal one
reached by stepping outside them all."6
Markovits distorts this Kantian project. He lumps it with utilitarian
morality under the heading "modem moral thought,"6 8 and says that "the
modem moral idea [is] that a person's ethical duties are measured in the
third-personal currency of self-sacrifice. 69 The problem with such a view,
says Markovits, is that it
underplays the idea that even with equality and impartiality in place,
each person continues to need to identify specifically with his own
actions, to see them as contributing to his peculiar ethical ambitions
in light of the fact that he occupies a special position of intimacy and
concern - of authorship - with respect to his own actions and life
plan.70
My first point in reply is that this claim, that modem moral thought
emphasizes self-sacrifice and makes no room for a person's particular
connection - as author- to his actions and life plans, is simply false. We
have already seen that it does not apply to Nagel. But Nagel is far from
unique. Another leading contemporary Kantian, Barbara Herman, puts her
views this way:
For morality to respect the conditions of character (one's integrity as
a person), it must respect the agent's attachments to his projects in a
way that permits his actions to be the expression of those
attachments. Kantian morality, understood as a morality of limits,
can do this. What it cannot do is honor unconditional attachments.
71
For Herman, morality may require one to sacrifice one's projects if they
66. NAGEL, supra note 8, at 15.
67. Id. at 15-16.
68. Markovits, supra note 1, at 223.
69. Id. at 224.
70. Id. at 225 (emphasis in original).
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are truly morally impermissible. But that is as it should be. Who could
expect morality to say otherwise? Requiring one to sacrifice one's
projects if they are truly morally impermissible should not, however, be
taken to imply that Kantian morality is a morality based on self-sacrifice.
Rather, as Herman points out, the starting point for a Kantian is an agent's
maxim or statement of the principle on which he acts. In other words, the
starting point is the agent's own sense of what makes his action
meaningful. And morality comes into play, in the first instance, to check
the tendency we have to tell ourselves that actions we disapprove of in
others are ones we are allowed to take because we are somehow special.
The moral categorical imperative warns us not to treat ourselves as
entitled to special dispensations just because we are the agents acting. In
this sense, the categorical imperative does provide a kind of impartial
check on partiality. But it is not a check that requires us to put away our
partiality. It is merely a check that requires us to be partial only when
partiality is impartially acceptable.
To illustrate the point, consider the example of doing good things for
one's friends, but not, or not to the same degree, for strangers. Kantian
morality holds that one can properly prefer doing good things for one's
friends. It does not hold this because such a preference would help in the
pursuit of some impartial goal, such as maximizing the general welfare. It
accepts that this preference is grounded in the way one naturally values
one's friends. The moral issue arises when one checks to see if acting on
this natural preference is permissible. Kantian morality would hold that it
is permissible to prefer one's friends as long as this kind of partiality is
impartially acceptable. Because there is no reason to think this kind of
preference runs afoul of some impartial constraint on the way we can each
be partial, it is a permissible preference.7 2
Having discussed the views of two prominent Kantians on the way
partiality is integrated into a Kantian moral theory, I offer now a general
argument that any plausible deontological theory based on rights has to
embrace partiality. At the core of any deontological theory is the claim
that we all have a duty to respect the rights of others. These rights are not
themselves limited by utilitarian concerns with optimizing welfare. One's
right to one's property, for example, does not give way whenever another
could make better use of it.73 One's rights to one's life and liberty,
likewise, are more robust than that. Consider the variation on Jim's case
72. Consider, for one last piece of evidence, this statement by another leading Kantian, Thomas
Hill: "[T]his idea that we should live with our eyes fixed on abstract, impartial principles seems quite
the opposite of what autonomous moral legislators would recommend." THOMAS HILL, AUTONOMY
AND SELF-RESPECT 45 (1991).
73. At a certain point, property rights may give way, but not whenever it would maximize utility.
Also, utilitarian types of reasons may affect the allocation of property rights in the first place, but
rights, once vested, cannot be displaced for utilitarian reasons on a case by case basis.
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introduced in the last section. John does not lose his right to life simply
because twenty others would live if he were killed. In sum, rights protect
people against impartial utilitarian optimization as well as they protect
people against more partially motivated attacks. But this protection would
be meaningless if people did not also have the moral authority to be
partial. There would be no point in having rights if one were morally
prohibited from exercising them. Indeed, there would be no point in
having rights if one were always subject to criticism if one used them in a
way inconsistent with some impartial utilitarian-type of standard. I am not
saying that impartiality is irrelevant to rights. Any plausible deontology
has to treat the allocation of rights as responsive to the thought that all
humans are fundamentally of equal moral status. But from the point of
view of an individual who has rights, he should view his rights as
providing him with a morally protected space in which to lead his own life
with his own priorities. Thus, at the very foundation of deontology is a
protection of partiality.
C. Sources of Markovits 's Misreading of Kantian Ethics
Why, then, does Markovits think the Kantian cannot handle the personal
point of view? This is not the place to speculate psychologically, but I do
want to emphasize two ways that Markovits's paper goes astray. One is
by following Bernard Williams's influential but mistaken critique of
Kantian ethics in terms of integrity.74 The other is by misreading the work
of Christine Korsgaard, who Markovits looks to, plausibly enough, as a
spokesperson for Kantianism.
1. Markovits and Williams on Kantianism and Integrity
Markovits, like Williams, thinks that Kantian morality alienates a
person from his basic projects and thus from his integrity. And Markovits
takes up Williams's example of Jim and the dictator to argue the point.
We've been using a variation on that example, in which Jim would have to
kill John, who is not already threatened. But in the original version, the
dictator tells Jim that if he, Jim, kills one of the twenty people, then he, the
dictator, will free the rest.75 In other words, the difference between the
original and the variation we've been discussing is that in the original, the
one who would be killed would die anyway. And that seems to make a
difference. It is at least arguable that one should be permitted to shoot the
one if he is going to die anyway and many other lives can be saved.76
74. See Markovits, supra note I, at 226, citing Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77-150 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).
75. See Markovits, supra note 1, at 227. See also Williams, supra note 74, at 98.
76. Korsgaard points out that it makes a difference if we imagine Jim communicating with the
twenty. Korsgaard, supra note 65, at 296. 1 discuss this further in the next subsection, at notes 93 to 96
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The point of the example, for both Williams and Markovits, is that
impartial morality seems to dictate that Jim should kill one to save the
other nineteen. But both rightly insist that Jim should not see this as a
simple opportunity to maximize the good. Even if, all things considered,
he should kill one to save nineteen, he should still recognize that his
interest in not killing has moral weight. Yet, according to Markovits,
third-person morality, including Kantian morality, "recommend[s] that
Jim should accept the dictator's offer and kill.""
The problem with relying on this example to beat up Kantians is that
Kantians can handle it in stride. Nothing Markovits says about the
example is something that can't be said by a Kantian. He says, for
example, that "a person who thinks it straightforward that Jim should kill
the one.. . places his own decisions at the mercy of other people's
projects and thereby attacks his own moral personality."78 But a Kantian
can acknowledge that it is not clear what Jim should do, and can
acknowledge that the reason it is unclear is that Jim may have a strong
interest in not killing. Indeed, as a Kantian myself, it seems to me that the
most plausible thing to say about Jim's choice is that if killing the one was
sufficiently respectful to be permissible, then it would be a beneficent act
that Jim would have an imperfect duty to consider performing. An
imperfect duty of this sort is a duty grounded in the general duty to take
seriously the welfare of others. It is imperfect because it leaves one at
liberty to weigh the importance of the welfare of others against other
competing ends. The Kantian, then, need not put Jim at the mercy of the
dictator. Jim is, as we all are, at the mercy of circumstances, always
vulnerable to being confronted with difficult moral choices. But the
Kantian can recognize the weightiness of the choice and leave the
weighing to Jim.
It might be objected that I am taking too superficial a read on
Williams's integrity objection. At the core of integrity, as Williams uses
it, is the fact that people have certain "ground projects," "the loss of all or
most of [which] would remove meaning" from a person's life.79 The
objection to Kantianism is that its demands might conflict with a person's
ground projects and thereby leave a person without the possibility of
leading a meaningful life.
But if anything, seeing the objection in these stark terms helps the
Kantian. It is unreasonable to expect that one can have an ethical life and
not have to run the risk that moral constraints will prevent one from
and accompanying text.
77. Markovits, supra note 1, at 229.
78. Id.
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pursuing one's basic projects. Suppose, for example, that one becomes ill
and can pursue one's ground projects only if one can find a cure. Further
suppose that the only cure one can find would require one to kill another
and use his organs. Clearly, one simply has to reconcile oneself to
abandoning those projects. One cannot justify treating another as
expendable in this way. Morality need not allow one to do whatever it
takes to pursue the ground projects one has adopted. It need only allow
one to form, and to have a reasonable expectation of being able to carry
out, plans and projects that give one's life meaning. The caricature of an
evil person, common in popular movies, TV shows, and other media, is of
a person who pursues his own projects no matter what the cost. A good
person, by contrast, knows how to pursue his projects within the bounds of
morality, and knows how to let go when morality gives him no other
choice. Interestingly enough, not only can many people still find meaning
in their lives after letting go of what was once a ground project; many can
even find the experience of having to let go to be a profound and in some
ways positive growing experience.
The above response is really a response to Williams and not Markovits,
however. Markovits recasts Williams's integrity argument from one based
on "ground projects" to one based on the need to have an integrated and
coherent character, and to act in ways consistent with and grounded in it."0
For Markovits, the important point is that people should see themselves
"as independent agents [acting on] first-personal reasons [that are], at least
sometimes, self-authoritative and first-personal all the way down, that is,
not merely applications of third-personal ideals to peculiar facts about
particular persons but rather independent of the third-personal at every
level."8 1  Or, putting it another way, respect for integrity requires
recognition of the fact that "[t]he separateness of persons as agents is
inconsistent with understanding persons as mere locally interchangeable
delegates or representatives of a single over-arching scheme of third-
personal impartial ethical ideals."
82
The rhetoric here sounds, borrowing a phrase from Davidson, "heady
and exotic."83 But as we have seen, it just doesn't make sense. It trades on
the bogus contrast between first-person and third-person justification.
Markovits is right to reject the thought that people should conceive of
themselves as "delegates or representatives of a single over-arching
scheme of third-personal impartial ethical ideals." But this is the kind of
point that Herman points out Kantians can take perfectly in stride. They
are not asking people to treat themselves as mere representatives of some
80. See id. at 248, 253.
81. Id. at 254.
82. Id. at 255.
83. See Davidson, supra note 57.
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impersonal "kingdom of ends." Kantians, or at least Kantians such as
Herman, Nagel, and myself, ask only that people recognize that the
reasons they have - grounded in their core life projects and the desires
central to their character - are not unconditionally valid. They don't have
to see these reasons as grounded in impartial reason. They only have to
ensure that the reasons pass moral muster as reflecting the kind of
partiality that is impartially acceptable.
What about Markovits's thought that integrity concerns coherence of
actions and character? He is concerned for lawyers because he thinks that
many of them do not have characters that are capable of dealing
coherently with the demands of being a lawyer. He is worried that a
lawyer's "self-effacing loyalty [to his client], his commitment to speaking
his client's part rather than his own, means that no advocate can be a
sincere.., man in the performance of his daily business, something that
can have remarkably deep, absolutely chilling consequences for the
lawyer's character." 84
I don't want to deny that Markovits is onto something here. Many
lawyers do struggle with the role of being a self-effacing advocate. And
rightly so; if taken as far as it is often taken, it is an ethically degenerate
role (more on that in Part III). But there is no reason a lawyer, even in our
real-world zealous adversary system, need be so self-effacing as to lose
the possibility of sincerity in his life as a whole. Indeed, the thought that a
lawyer would lose the possibility of sincerity in his life as a whole seems
to reflect a peculiar psychological premise in Markovits's view. As
Markovits puts it in an analogy: "Prizefighters, for example, cannot be
gentle ..."I5 Who, other than Markovits, says? I can at least imagine that
some prize-fighters channel all of their aggression into the ring and are
otherwise completely gentle. Likewise, I am convinced there are lawyers
who argue views that they don't personally believe or respect on the job,
but who are perfectly sincere in other areas of their lives. People have a
remarkable ability to compartmentalize and contextualize.
So much, then, for Markovits's concern with integrity. But there is
another aspect of Williams's critique of Kantianism, one that Markovits
does not pick up but that may nonetheless still be motivating his belief that
Kantianism cannot properly make room for the personal. The aspect of
Williams's critique I am talking about deals with the thought that Kant
says one's actions have moral worth only insofar as they are done "from
duty."86 Williams objects that this does not leave humans properly in
touch with their natural motivations. We do not want spouses, for
example, to do good things for each other out of duty, but out of affection.
84. Markovits, supra note 1, at 281 (internal quotations omitted).
85. Id.
86. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 60, at 65 (Academy page 397).
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Williams describes this charge against Kantians by saying that Kantians
want moral agents to have "one thought too many." 87 It is one thought too
many to care about duty in many situations where other motives, like
affection, should be the only motives in play.
Herman has given, I think, the proper response from the Kantian point
of view. In her response, she discusses one of the cases Williams uses to
try to show that a Kantian would have "one thought too many," that of a
husband who has the choice to save his wife or someone else.
Suppose we asked, after the fact, "Why did you save her [rather than
others who you could have saved]?" We would get the answer,
"Because I love her" or "Because she's my wife." It is morally
appropriate (not in any way inappropriate) in these circumstances to
act on these reasons. None of this is undermined by the agent's
awareness (he need hardly be thinking of it) that in some
circumstances the reason would not be sufficient to justify his action.
(Suppose he would have to throw a child overboard to reach her [his
wife].) It is in this sense that "the thought that it was his wife" is not
separate from moral considerations. It would be one thing if the
husband paused to weigh the claims of his wife against those of
others he might save; that would speak against his having the kind of
attachment that might be hoped for by his wife. What the Kantian
requires is only that he not view his desire to save his wife as an
unconditionally valid reason. This does not stand in the way of the
direct expression of attachments in action.
88
I take it, then, that there is nothing devastating in Williams's or
Markovits's critique of Kantianism in terms of integrity. Jim can accord
moral weight to his interest in avoiding the trauma of killing another.
Even if, all things considered, he has sufficient reason to kill the other, it is
hard to see how he could be required to kill the other. Were Jim not to kill
the other, the worst thing a Kantian should say is that he is too squeamish.
But such a criticism does not imply that he had no business being
squeamish, or reluctant to kill, at all. And lastly, when one does act on
non-moral reasons, as one would in most circumstances, one need not
have "one thought too many," actively wondering whether it is morally
permissible to do so. One need only be aware, at some level, that one's
non-moral reasons are conditionally valid.
2. Markovits 's Misreading of Korsgaard
The failure of the integrity criticism notwithstanding, one might make
the following objection: the position I embrace, the position just sketched
by Herman, seems to rely on what Nagel calls agent-relative value. This
87. Williams, supra note 80, at 18.
88. Herman, supra note 71, at 42.
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is the kind of value that Korsgaard, in some sense, rejects. Since
Korsgaard is arguably the leading Kantian of the age, it is at least
controversial that a Kantian can avail herself of such a notion. Indeed,
Markovits seems to think Kantians cannot handle Jim's case precisely
because Korsgaard rejects agent-relative value - which Markovits locates
in the first-personal domain of ethics89 - and because she seems to get
Jim's case wrong. She seems to get Jim's case wrong because she seems
to think that if it is permissible for Jim to kill the one, then he is obliged to
do so, regardless of his own values. Markovits thinks these points are
linked and telling against Kantianism.
My response is two-fold. First, while Korsgaard does reject agent-
relative value in the sense that Markovits wants to use it - value that
registers only in first-personal justifications - she is on solid ground in
doing so. This much was established in the previous section. Moreover,
there is a sense in which Korsgaard accepts a notion of agent-relative
value, and it is all we need to let us understand the kind of position just
sketched by Herman. Second, Markovits reads Korsgaard on Jim
uncharitably. On a charitable and ultimately more plausible reading, there
is no reason to think Korsgaard is blind to the moral relevance of Jim's
desire not to kill.
On the first point, Korsgaard illustrates her position on agent-relative
values with the example of someone who wants to climb a mountain. If
the climber is articulate, according to Korsgaard, she can explain why she
climbs in terms that make sense generally. "She may tell you things about
the enlarged vistas, the struggle with the elements, the challenge of
overcoming fears or surpassing physical limitations. She takes her desire
to climb mountains to be a motivated desire, motivated by recognizably
good features of the experience of climbing."9 In other words, she will be
able to explain her desire in terms that are part of a generally shared
conception of what makes action worthwhile.
The fact that her reasons should make sense to everyone does not mean
that everyone should then want to climb mountains just like her. Her
reasons may appeal particularly to her. How can that be if they make
sense to everyone as reasons to climb a mountain? The answer is that her
reasons concern not just the act of climbing a mountain, but the way that is
good for a person like her. Her reasons may thus have to refer to her
history, her tastes and pleasures, her relationships. They show how her
actions reasonably connect to her history and nature. They still constitute
her story, even if they should, ideally, make sense to any listener.9
89. Markovits, supra note 1, at 236.
90. Korsgaard, supra note 65, at 289.
91. Korsgaard wants also to argue that reasons are "'intersubjective" rather than objective. Id. at
289-91. 1 don't think I need to engage her on this issue to embrace her use of agent-relative reasons.
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This kind of account of agent-relative reasons is all we need to
understand Herman's point about saving one's spouse rather than another.
Recall that what we expect a healthy person to say in such a situation is
that he saved his spouse because he loves her. His love for her explains
his desire to save her; it explains why he had a reason to save her rather
than someone else. Spelling it out in this way should make sense to any
listener. His reason for saving his spouse is his reason, just as she is his
spouse. But all can share in the thought that that is a good reason for him
to act. Moreover, there is no reason to think the reason should be in any
way more private than that.
Regarding the claim that Korsgaard gets Jim's case wrong, my response
is that Markovits reads Korsgaard's position on Jim's case uncharitably
and implausibly. Here is what Korsgaard says. She wants to establish that
is it important to know what the twenty people whom the dictator
threatens want Jim to do. So she says, "Suppose the oldest Indian steps
forward and says, 'Please go ahead, shoot me, and I forgive you in
advance."' 9  She contrasts that with a case in which the twenty are
pacifists who say to Jim, "We would rather die than ask you, an innocent
man, to commit an act of violence." 93 Regarding this second case, in
contrast to the first, Korsgaard says, "Now the decision not to shoot looks
much more tempting, doesn't it? Now you can at least imagine refusing."94
It is this last line that can make Korsgaard's position seem too strict. It
seems to imply that she does not make any room for Jim's own values.
For the implication of saying that now you can imagine refusing is that in
the other case refusing is unimaginable. That, in turn, seems to imply that
Jim has a clear obligation to shoot in the first case, when the "oldest
Indian" asks Jim to shoot him to save the others. Markovits latches onto
this, saying that for a Kantian, "once the innocent consents to being killed,
Jim is obligated to do the killing regardless of his own ideals. 9 5
I think this reads too much into Korsgaard's statement. Her point here
was simply to focus on the reasons the agent confronts when he concerns
himself with the welfare of others and the question of whether they have
consented to what he might want to do. I see no reason to think she would
want to deny Jim the freedom to refuse to shoot, even if the oldest Indian
asked him to, if he were a committed pacifist himself. Perhaps she would
want to say that pacifism in such a case is unreasonable - that it shows a
form of self-indulgence. But I can see no reason to think she would say it
is impermissible. That is, I can see no reason for her to say to Jim in that
case that he "is obligated to do the killing regardless of his own ideals."
92. Id. at 296.
93. Id.
94. id.
95. Markovits, supra note 1, at 247.
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Indeed, to interpret what she says correctly, it is important to see it in
light of her larger purpose in discussing Jim's case. Her larger purpose is
to show that Nagel was confused when he tried to locate the ground for
deontological restrictions in the kind of first-personal agent-relative
reasons that Markovits refers to. She says, "If the deontological reason
were agent-relative, merely my property, my victim would not have the
right to demand that I act on it."9 6  Her point is that deontological
restrictions have to be grounded in the respect others are due, a respect
that registers in "reasons we can share." Thus, her focus in Jim's case was
on the reasons grounded in the claims of the possible victims. But this
focus, in one section of one article, provides no reason to take her, or
Kantians in general, to be blind to the relevance of an agent's own ideals
in determining what, all things considered, the agent should do.
In sum, Kantian ethics is built around the need to balance the partial
with the impartial. It aspires to make sense of the conditions by which one
can be "worthy of happiness."97 The ultimate goal of Kantian morality,
therefore, is not self-sacrifice. It is finding a way to integrate the demands
of impartiality into a life that is fundamentally partial, fundamentally
aimed at the agent's own happiness. This is the project Markovits wants
to carve up into two separate domains of justification. But since the first-
person domain is conceptually incoherent, the better approach for
Markovits, or anyone, to take is the Kantian one.
III: LEGAL ETHICS IN THE REAL WORLD
In Part I, I argued that, even in the real world, a lawyer can't rely on the
fact that he operates in an adversary system to give him reason to work for
an unscrupulous client. There may be sufficient reasons to help certain
clients obtain their immoral ends. This is generally true of criminal cases,
and often true of civil cases that involve protecting basic liberty rights.
But these reasons outweigh the general reason not to help people obtain
immoral ends. They do not imply that lawyers have ethical carte blanche
to serve any client's ends.
I also argued that in an ideal adversary system, there would be no reason
for a good lawyer to lie, cheat, or abuse. But I admitted that this would be
different in our real world zealous adversary system. As I said, in the non-
ideal zealous system, one may have to play dirty to stay competitive. And
this playing dirty is the ground of a real ethical taint.
In Part II, I argued that we cannot understand the nature of the ethical
tension that good adversary lawyers face as Markovits suggests. His
attempt to understand the problem of criticizing obligatory acts in terms of
96. Korsgaard, supra note 65, at 297.
97. See KANT, supra note 60, at 61 (Academy page 393).
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the possible conflict between first-person and third-person frameworks for
moral justification is based on a fundamental philosophical confusion. A
first-person framework for moral justification makes no sense. Moreover,
a proper moral theory finds a way to take both the partial and impartial
points of view into account.
In this Part, I offer a different explanation of how obligatory acts could
nonetheless merit criticism. First, I explain why the problem is one of
more or less intractable non-ideal theory. I argue that the problematic
behavior of even good lawyers in the real world results from a race to the
bottom. I then suggest that the tension even good lawyers feel reflects the
gap between the ideal and the real world. The criticism that even good
lawyers face registers our moral discomfort with the non-ideal world both
in general and in a number of specific ways.
A. The Race to the Bottom
As we saw in the end of Part I, the inescapable problem in the non-ideal
world is the need to play dirty to prevent deserving clients from being put
at an unfair disadvantage when going up against unscrupulous lawyers.
The question is, why is this need as pervasive as it is? The answer might
seem simple: playing dirty is legal and it helps lawyers get ahead. At
another level, however, there is a puzzle. Why should bad sportsmanship
be the norm? This question can, in turn, be broken down into two
questions: Why is bad sportsmanship legal? And given that it is legal,
why do lawyers act that way?
If one simply read the rules governing the ethics of lawyers, one might
wonder whether bad sportsmanship was even legal. The ABA's Model
Rules seem to require that lawyers avoid a lot of the shenanigans that I
described above as cheating. For example, Rule 3.4 says that "A lawyer
shall not ... in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or
fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party."98 This is clearly inconsistent
with the dilatory tactics lawyers use when they seek unnecessary
discovery just to prolong cases and drive up expenses for the other side.
And Rule 3.3 says that "A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." 99 The official comment on
this rule says that the "underlying concept is that legal argument is a
discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to
the case."' 0 This is exactly the concept of legal argument I relied on in
describing an ideal adversary system, so it would seem that zealous,
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d).
99. Id. at R. 3,3(a)(1).
100. Id. at 3.3 cmt. [3].
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misleading arguments are contrary to Rule 3.3.
Yet the clear reality is that lawyers often, and perhaps generally, flout
these rules in spirit if not in letter. Why? Again, at one level the answer is
easy: there is a gap between the letter and the spirit of the law, and lawyers
are trained - if not officially by their law schools, then unofficially by
their legal peers - to think like Holmes's bad man. They are trained, that
is, to avoid breaking the letter of the law (taking this to be what will be
enforced with sanctions), while at the same time flouting its spirit to get
every advantage possible. Consider these guidelines for cross-
examination, stated by Irving Younger, once a popular lecturer on legal
tactics:
Never ask anything but a leading question.
Never permit the witness to explain his or her answers.
Don't bring out your conclusions in the cross-examination. Save
them for closing arguments when the witness is in no position to
refute them.10'
Clearly, these guidelines, meant to educate young lawyers, do not direct
the lawyer to help the jury learn the truth. Instead, they are concerned
solely with teaching a lawyer how to win. But they can be followed
because they flout only the spirit of the law, not the letter.
Why is there a gap between the letter and the spirit of the law? Why
shouldn't one get severely sanctioned whenever one flouts the spirit of the
law? In part, the answer is that the law is a cumbersome machine, and to
sanction a lawyer is just to add litigation to litigation. The expense of
compounding litigation this way, for the legal system, not to mention the
parties, means that only the worst abuses will result in sanctions. But the
answer is also, in part, that we need rules. We don't trust judges to
administer sanctions without some guidance from rules that limit their
discretion. Rules that limit discretion, however, will necessarily be
somewhat mechanical. And being mechanical, they will be over- and
under-inclusive with regard to their underlying principles or spirit.
This may explain why bad sportsmanship is often legal. But something
else is going on here. It does not explain why lawyers are often such bad
sports, disrespecting the spirit of the rules that govern their profession.
This phenomenon is somewhat anomalous, and therefore calls for
explanation. Of course, society has bad men who walk the line, but it also
has good men who seek to obey the spirit of the law - who take their legal
obligations seriously as moral obligations. Our society, in fact, seems to
be one governed by law, which means that most people take their legal
101. Frank Moya, The Teacher Takes the Final Exam, NATIONAL L.J. 22 (Nov. 17, 1981), quoted
in LUBAN, supra note 5, at 70.
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obligations seriously. One might hope, even if naively, that people trained
in the law would appreciate and respect its moral weight more than the
population at large. Why, then, is it that the legal profession seems
dominated by bad men? Why does it seem that even the good men act like
bad men?
The answer here, I think, has many parts. First, there is the economic
pressure on lawyers. In a free market economy, clients shop around for
lawyers. And obviously clients want to win. They will pay more for a
lawyer who they think is more likely to win for them. A lawyer who
scrupulously maintains the moral high ground is less likely to win than
one who is at least willing to play the game hard and dirty. Obviously, the
more clever, articulate, and knowledgeable a lawyer is, the more likely it
is that she can do well without playing dirty. But, unfortunately, sound
arguments - even if clearly stated - often pale in comparison with
emotional rhetoric, appeals to prejudices, nasty tactical maneuvers, and
trickery. Consider again Younger's advice on cross-examination. All else
being equal, a lawyer who allows witnesses to refute his arguments will be
at a disadvantage compared with a lawyer who follows Younger's advice.
And the lawyer at a disadvantage - the lawyer who is less likely to win, all
else being equal - will be less sought after and less well paid.
The economic factor also plays into two psychological factors. First, a
lawyer is not only likely to feel more successful if she wins than if she
loses, but in addition, she is likely to feel more successful if she is more
sought after. Being sought after because one is a winner, and being
overlooked even though one has moral integrity, reinforce the ethos of the
profession that a winning lawyer is a good lawyer. Second, if a majority
of the profession adopts the ethos which holds that cheating is the norm,
then a lawyer will be socially reinforced by her peers for cheating, and
may even be socially shunned as a sort of prude if she refuses to cheat.
Still, these same things can be said of sports, yet many in sports, even
professional sports, hold onto a norm of good sportsmanship. Why the
difference? I think the biggest factor is that poor sportsmanship in sports
can rarely give an athlete a serious leg up unless it is so clearly a violation
that it can be caught and sanctioned. Consider, for example, steroid use.
It can give an athlete a serious leg up, but it can also often be detected.
The threat of detection undermines the incentive to cheat that way, and as
long as cheating is not generally accepted, there is social pressure not to
cheat. In law, by contrast, cheating is more likely to be effective without
being sanctioned. A more talented lawyer is more likely to be able to win
without resorting to cheating than an untalented lawyer. But in a close
case, if a talented lawyer is confronted by a less talented but competent
lawyer who also plays dirty, the talented lawyer might lose if he does not
play the same games.
The pressure to play dirty is exacerbated by a number of additional
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factors. First, the context of litigation is one in which goodwill has broken
down and at least one of the parties is looking to the state to force the
other party to do as he wants. Of course, much lawyering takes place
outside of litigation. But litigation colors the whole process. A good
lawyer is always trying to make sure that if litigation should arise, her
clients will come through the process as well off as possible. Thus, all
lawyering is colored by a mindset of distrust that is inevitably at the core
of litigation. Goodwill between the parties may overcome lawyerly
distrust when parties are cooperatively doing business together. But the
latent distrust can erupt quickly to drive lawyers and their clients to treat
the other side as undeserving of respect. And this can seem to warrant
playing dirty. For if one thinks that the other side is unscrupulous, then
one will feel an especially strong moral urge to do whatever one can to
ensure that the immoral party is not able to exploit the law and prosper.
A related factor is that lawyers develop a kind of blind spot. As they
work with their clients, they naturally start to internalize their clients'
points of view. As a result, lawyers often feel more righteous about the
cases they are arguing than they rationally should. They absorb the
partiality of their role in such a way that they come to feel as though they
are actually being impartial when they make their case. As a result, they
are likely to feel too often that they have the kind of strong moral reason
to combat the other side that seems to make cheating a necessary means to
a worthy end.
Another factor that undoubtedly plays a role is that people with a strong
sense of ideals and integrity often have trouble with the rough combat of
the adversary system. After a few years of practice, they seek to leave the
law. This serves as a kind of filter, weeding out, as it were, those who are
not comfortable cheating. The resulting pool of people who thrive on
combating each other with any dirty play they can use makes it that much
more likely that the norm of the profession will be zealous and not
idealistic, at least with regard to means.
Finally, there is an ideological feedback loop. As these influences arc
felt, the profession will develop a kind of false ideology which says that
lawyers should use any trick they can to win. This is the philosophical
expression of the social pressure mentioned earlier. If lawyers believe that
their goal is to win in any way they can as long as they are not severely
sanctioned, then they are more likely to cheat and play dirty. And as
cheating becomes (or remains) the statistical norm, it reinforces the false
ideology which says that the zealous adversary system is actually morally
justifiable as well.
Thus runs the race to the bottom in which the only thing holding back a
lawyer's actions in the effort to win is the threat of sanction. To say it is a
race to the bottom is not to imply that it was ever far from the bottom.
There may have been a time when some of these pressures were less
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intense and a professional ethos would have restrained playing dirty more
than is the case today. Older lawyers talk as if this is the case, though one
has to worry that their talk is more a reflection of the rosy tint of nostalgia
than accurate historical reporting. Whether things were once better or not,
the point is that there are a number of factors pushing the system strongly
in the direction of zealous advocacy.
Non-ideal theory is essentially the theory of how one deals with a
system in which bad people have corrupted the practices.1"2 Some of the
factors mentioned here, like the lawyer's blind spot, do not involve anyone
behaving badly. But it is unscrupulous clients who provide the economic
pressure for lawyers to play dirty. And it is unscrupulous lawyers who
translate that pressure into the practical necessity of playing dirty back in
order to prevent deserving clients from being put at an unfair
disadvantage. And even the lawyer's blind spot is concerned, though in an
exaggerated way, with the need to combat those who seek more than they
deserve. Thus, it is fair to say that what we have in the real-world zealous
adversary system is an example of more or less intractable non-ideal
theory.
B. Ethical Analysis of the Zealous Adversary System
What should we say of a good lawyer who manipulates the legal system,
using rhetorical tricks and abusing strategic maneuvers, on behalf of a
worthy client? Is she behaving as she should - in a morally permissible
fashion, in a way that merits criticism - or as she may not? In a sense, she
may well behave as she should. Given the adversary system we have,
such techniques may be necessary to the pursuit of justice. If we can't ask
deserving clients to throw themselves on their swords, we can't ask good
lawyers to let bad lawyers run their deserving client through with swords.
Such cheating tactics may be a necessary evil. There is an analogy in the
justification for killing in war. No one thinks such killing is good in itself,
but sometimes, when the war is just, soldiers who are themselves just
pawns in their government's games have to be killed, intentionally killed,
to protect other innocents.
Why, then, are lawyers criticized for their unethical behavior? Why
can't they defend themselves with honor, more on a par with military
honor? This may seem a particularly apt question given the way arms
races change military tactics, much as the race to the bottom that I've
described changes adversary tactics in law.
Part of the answer is that soldiers are often drafted and put under
another's command, and thus are not judged for those they kill, but for the
bravery they show. But this answer won't do for those who volunteer to
102- See RAWLS, supra note 62, at 245-48, 351.
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fight in a war. They know they are volunteering to join the effort to kill
other soldiers. Yet these soldiers, at least in a just war, are often regarded
as heroes, not villains. Whence the difference?
One difference may be that soldiers show real bravery. This is rarely
true for lawyers. Lawyers put others at risk, but the only lawyers who
really put themselves at risk are those who take a case on a contingency
basis or those who defend dangerous and despised criminal defendants.
But even they are hardly ever gambling with their lives and health. Thus,
lawyers are lacking a key virtue that has always tended to glorify soldiers.
Another difference may be that lawyers for the "other guy" are always
around us. They are the lawyers that "we" criticize. Normally, unless
one's country is under foreign occupation or repressive military rule, we
only see "our" soldiers. So there is an asymmetry in affection.
And there is, I think, one other difference that matters. The ideal of war
does not impose many restrictions on how soldiers can fight other soldiers.
If one is fighting a just war, the objective is to win, and the restrictions on
the means that one can use concern primarily what can be done to
civilians. The ideal of litigation imposes more restrictions on what one
should feel free to do to the other party. This difference should not be
surprising. Resort to litigation indicates that goodwill has broken down
but not that law has broken down. The law is still supposed to provide a
better alternative than brute force. War, by contrast, occurs when law too
has broken down and the only tool left to use is brute force.
Now I don't mean to deny that soldiers can be villains in the public's
eye too. If the war is unjust, soldiers look bad, even if they are conscripts.
If the war is unjustly prosecuted, without sufficient regard for civilians,
soldiers look bad. The Viet Nam war seemed to involve at least the
second problem, if not also the first. That is why so many people
criticized the soldiers, and why so many soldiers themselves seem to have
been so deeply disturbed by their own role in the war. Indeed, even in a
just war fought with just means, one would expect many soldiers to feel
some ethical discomfort at intentionally killing. Pacifism is not a
dominant philosophy in our culture, but it's not completely marginal
either. It appeals to the perfectly understandable thought that killing
another human is always morally problematic. But when the war is just
and the means are just, the soldier is in a less compromised position than
the adversary lawyer in a zealous adversary system. The lawyer is
deviating from the ideal of her role, while a soldier is not.
Still, one might reply, if sharp tactics must be used to keep a rough
balance of power, how can we say that they do not facilitate the proper
functioning of law? Yes, it would be better for the proper functioning of
law if both sides practiced advocacy in accordance with the ideal. But if
one side is going to use cheating tactics, the other side should, as well.
Otherwise, deserving parties will be put at an unfair disadvantage, and
2004]
41
Walen: Criticizing the Obligatory Acts of Lawyers: A Response to Markovits's Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
surely the law is not better served by putting a deserving party at an unfair
disadvantage.
Viewing the practice of law this way, by putting it in context, we can
see that there is a stronger analogy between the soldier and the lawyer than
I let on above. The soldier has to kill because the situation has become
truly about as far from ideal as it can come. Both goodwill and the law
have broken down, and now one has to hope that justice happens to be
served by might. The soldier may not deviate from any ideal of warfare,
but that's because warfare is so far from the ideal in the first place. The
zealous adversary system is also far from the ideal, but no farther. And if
a lawyer uses tactics that are justifiable given that she is acting in a
zealous adversary system, then she does not deviate from the relevant
ideal.
In line with this last response, it is tempting to say that criticism of
lawyers who use sharp practices may sometimes be misplaced. It makes
sense to criticize a lawyer who serves an undeserving client with sharp
practices. And it makes sense to criticize a lawyer who serves a deserving
client with sharp practices that go beyond those that are necessary to
prevent that deserving client from being at a disadvantage. But if a lawyer
sees that he must play dirty to protect his deserving client from being put
at an unfair disadvantage, he does not deserve criticism. He does not
deserve criticism because it would be false to claim that he has moral
reason, all things considered, to do otherwise. Criticism directed at such a
lawyer is then really misdirected. It should not be taken personally by the
lawyer. Rather, it should be understood simply as criticism of the general
state of the adversary system - of the extent to which it deviates from the
ideal.
This is not to say that criticism of good lawyers in the zealous adversary
system is misplaced altogether. It still serves a useful function. It can be
taken creatively as a call to avoid complacency, to do something to shake
up the system to try to bring it closer to the ideal. Even if it is a Sisyphean
task, there is value in those periods when there is ascent towards the ideal.
And it may be the case that reform, even if it never will bring about the
ideal, can raise the general level of practice some way away from the
bottom towards which the race is run.
As I said, that answer is tempting, but I am not fully satisfied with it.
Imagine a case in which you are a lawyer, you have a client who is a
deserving plaintiff, and you are at trial cross-examining a witness for the
other side. You believe this witness is telling the truth, and you believe
that if he is believed, the jury will likely rule against you. This is not
because the jury should rule against you. They are likely to rule against
you because they will likely not be able to put his testimony in the proper
context - they will give it too much weight. So you decide you need to
discredit him if you are to win, as you are convinced you should. How do
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you do so? You ask a series of leading questions and trap him into saying
something that sounds really stupid. You make him look like a fool,
despite the fact that you know he is not a fool. Now it's the end of the
day, and you reflect on what you have done. You saved your client's case.
But you did it with trickery. You tricked an honest witness into saying
things he should not have said. Do you feel good about yourself and your
actions? It is hard to see how, if you have any ethical core and any self-
transparency left, you could feel completely comfortable with what you've
done.
What then are we to say? You used both this witness and, in a way, the
jurors simply as a means of achieving the just end. A hard-core Kantian
would have to say that you behaved simply impermissibly. I myself think
we should be a bit flexible on such matters. There are times, I think, when
a person can be used simply as a means to achieving some important good.
There are times when the harm that results is not too great, and the good
achieved is substantial. You could argue that these conditions are met
here. The witness may resent you for your treatment of him, but he will
not, after all, be that badly hurt. And the jury may never realize what
you've done. Thus, I am still inclined to say that using them that way may
be morally permissible if it is truly necessary to achieve justice. That is,
you may not be morally required not to do what you did. And if you must
do it to serve justice, then you are arguably actually morally obliged to do
it.
But even if your action is permissible and even required, there is still a
strong moral reason not to do such things to people. A good person would
not be comfortable acting that way. At the very least, there is always the
danger that one will become calloused and insensitive to the reasons not to
treat people this way. There is also the danger that one will become
subject to the lawyer's blind spot and misjudge when such treatment can
be justified. And perhaps most importantly, there is always something
ethically disturbing in letting the ends justify the means when the means
are themselves disrespectful of others. For these reasons, at least, moral
criticism of the lawyer herself may serve a good end, keeping her from
being morally complacent, keeping her alive to the dangers of her practice.
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